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COMPETITION AND  HUMAN  CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: 
A THEORY  OF  INTERREGIONAL  SPECIALIZATION  AND THADE 
ABSTScI 
We  consider  a model with several regions whose technological  ability and factor 
endowments  are identical and in which transport costs between regions are non- 
negligible.  Nonetheless,  certain goods are sometimes  produced by multiple firms 
all of which are located in the same region.  These goods are then exported from 
the regions in which their production  is agglomerated.  Regional agglomeration of 
production and trade stem from two forces, First, competition between firms for 
the services of trained  workers is necessary for the workers to recoup the cost of 
acquiring industry-specific  human capital. Second,  the technology of production 
is more efficient when plants are larger than a minimum efficient scale and local 
demand is insufficient to support several firms of that scale.  We also study the 
policy implications of our model. 
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Cambridge,  MA 02139 Regional agglomeration in the production of goods is pervasive:  the Swiss special- 
ize in the production of watches and chocolates; Silicon Valley in computers; and shoes, 
haute couture, and movies originate disproportionately  in Italy, Paris, and Hollywood 
respectively. Regional specialization extends even  to product subcategories.  Within auto- 
mobiles, luxury sedans tend to come from Germany, sports cars from Italy, and reliable 
forms of basic transportation from Japan.  While, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model has it, 
some of this regional agglomeration results from differences in factor  endowments, much of 
it is difficult to explain in that manner.  For example, regional specialization in industrial 
products such as shoes and watches does not seem to be driven by the abundance of any 
particular  factor. 
The standard alternative  explanation  of  regional agglomeration  (e.g.  Marshall (1920), 
Melvin (1969), Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982)) is that, for given inputs, 
the output of an individual  firm is larger the larger is the aggregate  output of other 
firms producing  the same good in the same region.  So, for example,  the level of inputs 
required by a new watchmaker to produce a given output is lower if that entrant locates in 
Switzerland where there are other watch manufacturers.  Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) 
have shown that external returns of this type can also explain the fact that some nations 
seem to remain forever more advanced than others. 
A possible source of external economies of this kind is the spillover of knowledge i.e., 
the possibility that knowledge acquired by one agent can be used by others. In order for 
knowledge spillovers to provide  a compelling explanation,  however, it must be the case 
that they are somehow localized. If an engineer in Taiwan can reverse engineer a product 
of Silicon Valley as easily as an inhabitant of Silicon Valley, there is no good reason for 
1 regional concentration  of computer  companies. 
Marshall (1920)  posits  instead that the external  economies arise from proximity to 
specialized inputs.  As noted by Helpman  and Krugman  (1985), unless there is a natural 
comparative  advantage for the production of these inputs in the region, this explanation 
is incomplete.  The puzzle is simply rolled back to the previous production stage: Why do 
the producers of inputs locate in the region? 
Our theory is that the location decisions of the firms and their input suppliers  are 
interdependent.  Input  suppliers find it advantageous to be located where they have several 
potential customers because competition among their downstream customers assures them 
a fair return. In the absence of such competition,  the relatively immobile suppliers would 
be subject to the monepsony power of the downstream firms.  Foreseeing that monopsony 
power  would be used to drive down  input prices,  potential input  suppliers  would not 
choose to invest  ex ante in the accumulation of the capital necessary to supply the inputs 
efficiently.  This critical role of competition  in securing  a return to suppliers  is one of the 
elements in Porter's (1989) broad treatise  on regional  agglomeration. 
For concreteness, the particular input we focus on is industry specific human  capital 
which is costly  for individuals to acquire, such as the specific hand-eye coordination  needed 
to cut diamonds or the skills which facilitate the creation  of a new chocolate concoction. 
If  trained workers  can choose among several potential employers, they will be paid  as a 
function of their marginal product. By contrast, if there is only one potential employer, 
and it is impossible to write contracts  that specify the level of training, there is no reason 
for this monopeonist to pay trained employees any more than untrained employees earn 
(in this industry or elsewhere).  The hold-up problem  described  by Williamson (1975) 
arises. Confronted  with the prospect of  a single potential employer, workers do not find it 
worthwhile to accumulate  human  capital. Moreover, if entry by firms is costly, firms will 
themselves refrain from entering  if they  can expect  to be the only firm in the industry. 
The industry can only exist with several closely located  competitors. 
If  there is a minimum efficient scale below which each firm cannot operate profitably, 
the necessity of having several competing firms for an industry to be viable  implies that the 
2 region's output may have  to be substantiaL In particular,  demand in the producing region 
itself  may be insufficient to accommodate the requisite number  of firms. Then the only  way 
of ensuring competition among firms is to have several of them locate in one region and 
produce for the world market  We show that trade emerges between spatially separated 
regions with the same endowments and access to the same technology even though there 
are transport costs anti it is technologically feasible to produce all of a region's consumption 
locally.' 
Our theory involves an externality.  The presence of other firms is necessary for each 
firm to have access to suitable workers.  However, unlike the alternative theory of trade 
based on external returns, we do not require that the presence of other firms lower the 
input requirement for producing  output. instead, the technology for producing output is 
the same in all regions. 
Because each firm needs other firms to be present for workers to become trained, it 
might be though that our model has multiple equilibria in some  of  which no firm produces. 
This would be true is we insisted that the entry decisions of firms all be made simultane- 
ously. instead, following Farrell and Saloner (1985), we model firms as making this choice 
sequentially so that, through their actions,  they can communicate their intentions to each 
other. This makes it impossible for equilibria with no production  to coexist with others in 
which production  is positive. 
One of the most important implications of the traditional theory of trade based on 
external returns is that nations can be made worse off as a result of trade (see Graham 
(1923) and Ethier (1982)). In our model such losses from trade are possible as well. These 
losses are intimately linked to the existence of multiple equilibria.  In some equilibria (the 
agglomerated equilibria)  only one region produces the good even though, in autarky, the 
good is produced  in both regions. At these agglomerated equilibria the importing region 
can be worse off, In our model this happens  because there are transportation costs so that 
an imported good costs more than a locally produced  good.  In Ethier (1982) it occurs 
1  tb.t whil, monopy power pisy. e rol, in our story, our  formsi ,nod.l 1. roth diff.rd froos those rn th. ,srlr 
lit  retur,  on m000psosy  sod trede (Feeostrs  (1980), Mazkusen sod Robson (1980), McCuiioch  sod Y.iien (19)) in those 
modeli monopsonists  Sr. acti,.  in equilibrium.  By contrait, in our modol, the only i.ct,  th.t Sr. vsbis in .qu,librum hsvs 
sever'.1 firm, competing  for isbor. 
3 when one region produces  nothing other than the good subject to external returns. This 
can lead its price in terms of the other good to rise relative to autarky (even though it is 
produced  more  effIciently) because factor  demands rise in the producing region. 
We show that, in our context at least, the equilibria with losses from trade are not 
robust. They, again, depend crucially on the absence of any mechanism that allows the 
agents to tell each other that they would like to produce the good subject to the exter- 
nality,2  Formally, losses  from trade can occur in our model if workers must make their 
decision whether to become trained simultaneously. To capture the possibility that work- 
ers can communicate their intentions to each other we consider a variant of our model in 
which workers become trained in sequence.  In this case, the equilibrium is unique  and 
trade can only be beneficial. 
One difference between our theory and the traditional external returns approach is 
in the role ascribed to antitrust policy.  In the traditional theory, relaxation of antitrust 
policy can be socially desirable.  Cooperation among firms can lead them to internalize 
whatever externality  leads the production by one firm to lower the input requirements 
of the others. This logic has led Jorde and Teece (1988), for example, to conclude that 
antitrust exemptions are essential for certain US high-technology industries to succeed in 
a world  scale. 
By contrast,  in our theory as well as in Porter (1989), society benefits from competi- 
tion. The more competition  among firms the potential suppliers of labor expect,  the more 
willing they are to make industry specific investments.  Thus a vigorous antitrust policy 
can play an important role in promoting the creation of viable  export industries, 
Section 1 presents  the simple partial equilibrium setting in which  workers decide si- 
multaneously whether to acquire industry  specific human capital.  Section 2 embeds this 
model in general equilibrium  and considers trade among ex ante identical regions.  That 
section has several subsections in which we discuss the patterns of trade that emerge as the 
number  of goods and the number of  regions that trade varies. In one of these subsections 
we present our argument that if workers decide whether to become trained in sequence, 
2The Io  elfare.lo activity .quilibria in the rather differe,t pecunier)'  externality  modele  of  Murphy,  Shleifer  and Viehny 
(1989)  lack  robuitnee. for the same reuon. 
4 every region benefits from trade. 
In section 4 we consider the policy implications of our theory. In particular we study 
industrial policy, tariffs, and antitrust.  Industrial  policy encompasses those policies that 
governments pursue to affect the location  of industries.  In our model, such policies can 
raise welfare in the region imposing them.  The reason is that the goods subject to the 
externality are sometimes produced disproportionately  in one region.  But, the presence 
of transport costs implies that regions benefit from having such goods produced locally. 
Therefore, policies that ensure local production  of these goods can be desirable  from the 
region's point of view. 
While tariffs can be a tool of industrial  policy, they can also be imposed in situations 
where they do not affect the regional pattern of production.  The usual "optimum  tariff" 
argument implies that, after workers in the other region have become trained, importers 
benefit from such tariffs beacuse  they improve the importer's  terms of trade.  However, 
workers in the exporting  region who foresee that tariffs will be levied, have a smaller 
incentive to become trained.  So, the perception that tariffs will be imposed raises  the 
equilibrium price of the good in the exporting  region.  We show that, as a result, tariffs 
which are foreseen when workers seek training  unambiguously lower welfare in both regions. 
This strengthens  Lapan (1988)'s argument against  tariffs. 
1. The Partial  Equilibrium Model 
We assume  that skilled labor and entrepreneurial activities  are the only factors of pro- 
duction. The "entrepreneur",  who is also a skilled worker, must perform preparatory  work 
necessary to create the firm and enable it to function.  We assume that the entrepreneur 
has disutility of effort e for performing  those activities.  If he is successful in creating a 
firm that actually  operates, however, he derives utility of v from his success. 
Thus v—c, which we assume to be positive, is the net utility from becoming a successful 
entrepreneur. We focus mainly on the case where v — e is arbitrarily  small.  As we shall  see 
below, the role  of these assumptions on the costs and benefits of managing is to eliminate 
the indifference between producing and remaining idle that characterizes standard zero- 
profit competitive equilibria.  We suspect that introducing even a minimal level of market 
S power would have essentially the same effect. 
The other factor of production  is skilled labor.  At the margin,  each skilled worker 
can produce one unit of output.  However,  one of the central parameters  in our analysis 
is the minimum efficient scale of production.  We capture the presence of efficient scale by 
assuming that, to produce at all, the entrepreneur must employ S skilled workers including 
himself (i.e., he must hire S-  1 additional skilled workers). An entrepreneur is thus deemed 
successful, so that he receives v in utility, if his firm has S skilled workers. S is a measure 
of minimum efficient  scale, but there are constant returns to scale when the firm produces 
more than S. These assumptions can be formalized as follows: 
L(OS)L(S)5  if  0<1,  and  (i) 
L(9S)=0S  if  0>1  (2) 
where L(Q) is the amount of labor required to produce Q units, 
S determines the number of firms that the industry can accommodate.  If S is zero 
then  production  constant returns to scale globally and an arbitrarily  large  number 
of firms can  be present  at the same time.  For very large values of S the industry can 
accommodate at most a single firm, i.e., it is a natural monopoly. In between, the number 
of  firms that can operate in equilibrium  falls as S increases. 
In order to obtain the requisite skills to be  useful in this industry a worker must obtain 
training at a cost of h to himself. If  the worker chooses not to obtain training,  he can earn 
w in an alternative occupation.  Thus a worker will only be willing to become trained if he 
can earn w + h in this industry. 
The entrepreneur  is the sole residual claimant of the firm: he collects revenues from 
customers and pays the other workers. So, in addition to his net utility from performing 
the entrepreneurial  function, he earns whatever profits there are in equilibrium.  Despite 
the fact that the "entrepreneur"  receives both the profits and the net utility of success, 
for clarity in what follows we shall refer to the entrepreneur  as the agent who makes the 
decision to form a firm and enter the industry, and the firm as the agent that, once created 
by the entrepreneur,  makes the operational  decisions of the firm such as what wages to 
offer workers. 
6 The quantity of this product that is demanded equals D(P) where P is the price. 
What matters for the form of equilibrium outcomes is the relationship  between demand 
and minimum efficient scale S.  In particular, consider the demand when price equals 
marginal cost w +  h, D(w  It). Then the outcomes depend on the ratio of D(w +  h) to S. 
In particular, let: 
(3) 
where "int" denotes "the integer part oP. Then  we  will show that  the  form of the equilibria 
depends  on N. 
Our goal is to contrast the industry outcome when there is only a single firm in the 
industry 
— and hence it is a monopsony purchaser of skilled labor — with one in which 
firms compete for skilled workers. Since wage competition to attract workers is a critical 
aspect of our theory, we explicitly examine firms' strategies in bidding for workers.  By 
contrast, strategic interactions in the output market are unessential to our argument. We 
therefore assume that whenever there is more than one firm in the industry there exists a 
fictitious Walrasian auctioneer which clears the output market.  If there is only one firm, 
however, we make the natural assumption  that it is able to exercise its monopoly power 
in the output market in the usual  way. 
The timing in our model is as follows: First, I individuals decide to become en- 
trepreneurs  and perform the preparatory  work necessary for creating their firms (incurring 
disutility  e in the process).  Second, workers, including the entrepreneurs,  decide whether 
to obtain training. We denote the number of  workers who obtain training by L. Third, the 
firms simultaneously announce wages {tii,.  . . , tZ}. Fourth, workers  decide  whom  to work 
for. If  two or more firms offer the highest wage, workers are assumed to spread themselves 
uniformly across those firms. Finally, production  takes place and goods are sold at a price 
P which the Walrasian auctioneer sets to clear the goods market.3 
Our subgame perfect equilibrium  requires that:  (i)  Entrepreneurs  are successful; (ii) 
Workers make optimal training decisions; (iii) Firms choose {t1,. .. , ti} to maximize 
5We could hew con.ided  another  lIege  in  which firma decide  which of their workere they actually eeL  to produce goods. 
This would not change  the enslyir the firma would aek all the workera to produce. The reason is that  labor u the only factor 
of productin end labor  cost. are sunk  at the tin,. the declion  of how much to produce ii  made. 
7 profits; and (iv) workers make optimal employment decisions given {i,.  . . , 
We consider two cases separately.  In the first case N is greater than or equal  to  2 
while in the latter case it is smaller. In the former case it is feasible for two or more firms 
to produce at minimum efficient scale when the "competitive"  price w +  h prevails.  In the 
latter case that is not feasible: The industry  is a natural monopoly. 
LL Case (i): N ￿  2 
We show that, for v sufficiently close to e, the equilibrium has N firms and produces 
the "competitive"  outcome, In particular, prices and wages equal marginal  resource costs 
(including training), P =  = w  h, and the number of workers who obtain training is 
exactly the number  required to satisfy market demand at that price (L = D(w  h)).  To 
do this, we begin by exogenously specifying the number of entrepreneurs  N that enter, 
and examine equilibria of the subgames that ensue. 
(a) 2 <  <N 
We informally describe why the competitive outcome is an equilibrium of the subgame. 
In Appendix  A we provide a formal proof and in Appendix  B we show that it is the only 
one that can emerge in equilibrium. 
Consider first the entry decision of entrepreneurs.  With P° = w + h = tZ1', firms 
break even as long as they can produce at minimum efficient scale.  Thus entrepreneurs 
gain v — e by entering as long as N is in the range specified.  From the workers' point of 
view, anticipating  wages of w + h, any worker is indifferent between getting trained at a 
cost h (and receiving a wage of w + h) and not becoming trained and taking alternative 
employment  at a wage w.  Moreover, since all firms offer the same wage in equilibrium, 
workers are happy to spread themselves uniformly across the firms. Thus workers have no 
incentive to deviate.  Finally, consider the firms: If a firm unilaterally  lowers its wage it 
attracts no workers,4 if it raises its wage it loses money on each sale since then  sZ' > P° = 
w + h.  So the firms have no incentive to deviate, 
'To  be more prec., the Srm .ttrac no orlri 'ith the po.sibl. exception of the entrepreneur himself.  If S > 1 this 
will ensure the.t the firm  doesn't deviate by lowering the ..e. It  S =  1 the "flrm  can off the  entrepreneu?  (in hi, role Se 
killed vorher) w +  1. — (a —.) and still attract him.  Even in this extreme  case,  however, the amour by which the w,.ge  can 
fail  below  w +  i.  vanishe, as a -  s vanishes. 
8 To understand  the motivations of the agents, consider first the finns' wage announce- 
ments. In equilibrium the firms correctly anticipate  the market clearing price. Any firm, if 
it believes that its rivals are offering wages below the equilibrium market price, will itself 
offer  a tiny amount more than the highest wage being offered by a rival, attract all the 
workers, and thereby  maximize its profits. This logic drives the firms to bid the wage 
up to what they  believe the market clearing price will be.  That is to say, they behave 
analogously to Bertrand rivals in homogeneous goods output markets. 
The workers, for their part, understand that the wage will be bid up to the price 
which will be set to clear the market given that L workers are employed. They therefore 
correctly anticipate  that the wage will equal D1  (L). Therefore, additional workers obtain 
training until the number trained workers drives the market clearing price down to the 
wage at which a worker is willing to become trained and work in this industry, w + h. 
Although the industry  can accommodate up to N firms in the competitive equilibrium, 
the competitive outcome can be sustained  with just two firms in the industry  and the  entry 
of additional firms doesn't affect the price or wage that results (as long as  N). This 
is because Bertrand competition drives  the equilibrium wage to the level of the final goods 
price with just two firms in the market. 
Firms make zero profits in equilibrium.  However,  entrepreneurs  who have  entered are 
not indifferent about producing.  They derive utility v from producing.  Therefore,  each 
entrepreneur  tries to attract sufficient workers to produce at least S. So, trained workers 
can feel sure that entrepreneurs who have entered  will compete  for their  services and drive 
the wage to w + h. 
(b) i>  N 
The only possible equilibria have the wage equal to w + h.5 We show, however, that 
for v  sufficiently close to e there is no equilibrium where the wage equals w + Fm when 
N > N. To do this we suppose, in contradiction,  that the wage equals w +  Fm and consider, 
seriatim, the possibility that an equilibrium exists where (i) NS or more workers obtain 
training,  and (ii) fewer than NS workers do. 
'The proof to Appeodix  B epplies to this cees ee .eIL 
9 If NS workers or more obtain training and all obtain employment in this industry  the 
market clearing price is equal to D(NS) <w  + h.  But then if all the firms produce, the 
workers are spread  evenly over the firms and the  entrepreneurs earn v  — e+D'  (fTS) 
— (w + 
h). For v sufficiently close to e, this expression is negative  (because D'1(S) <w + h).6 
If fewer than NS workers obtain training it is not possible for all N entrepreneurs to 
be successful, i.e., there are insufficient trained workers for every entrepreneur  who entered 
to produce at minimum efficient scale, But then the unsuccessful entrepreneurs could have 
done better by not entering (and saving the disutility of effort e). 
(c) =l 
If only one firm has entered and some number of workers, L, has obtained training, 
the firm will pay them  just slightly above their alternative wage w and charge a price  equal 
to: 
max{D1(L),argmaxD(z)(z 
— w)}.  (4) 
The first expression is relevant when L is small so that the firm hires all the trained workers 
and charges a price which  clears the market.  The second expression is relevant when L is 
very large so that the firm can act in the usual monopoly fashion in the goods market. 
Note that after the workers have obtained training,  no-one has an incentive to deviate: 
Workers will work for this firm because they do not have a viable alternative. The result, 
of course, is that, anticipating  that they will not be compensated for their training costs, 
workers do not obtain training in the first  place.  This in turn means  that the single 
entrepreneur  suffers in vain his disutility of effort e. 
(d) Entry 
We have  discmed these outcomes by fixing the initial  number of  firms and have shown 
that entrepreneurs gain utility in equilibrium if the number  of them who enter is between 2 
and N but lose utility otherwise.  We now turn our attention  to the question  of the number 
of entrepreneurs who will enter initially. 
As in other models of external  economies, the entry  decision of firms is subject  to 
eThe rsxneinjng cease here. those  where  eome of the trsjned workere er. not employed in  thu  induatry,  or where eome of the 
entrepreneurs  who h*ve entered do not produce  - er. uninteresting:  th.  workers who end up unemployed  end the entreprueUrn 
who do not produce in  equilibrium  could he,, done better by not obtaining  treining or not entering  respectively. 
10 a coordination  problem. If potential firm i believes that no other potential entrants will 
enter, then it won't enter either. If it is the only firm that enters, potential workers know 
that it would end up paying a wage of w  and will not become trained.  Thus the firm 
would not have a workforce and the entrepreneur  would lose e. If, on the other hand, firm 
I believes that another firm will enter, then workers will obtain the necessary training, and 
the entrepreneur  will gain v — e. 
We follow Farrell and Saloner (1985) and assume that potential entrants must decide 
whether to enter in sequence, i.e., the second potential entrant decides whether to enter 
only after he knows whether the first potential entrant will enter. This ensures that firms 
can communicate their intentions  vis-a-vls  entry through their actions.  In the case where 
only a few firms will ever enter this seems more appealing than making all firms decide 
whether to enter simultaneously. That assumption forces firms to make their decision in 
the absence of any information about what other firms are planning.7 
With sequential  entry the Farrell and Saloner (1985)  reasoning eliminates no-entry 
equilibria in this case.  Indeed, the only equilibrium has N equal to N. All entrepreneurs 
that can possibly receive positive utility in equilibrium  enter. Since the N'th entrant enjoys 
positive utility v — e by entering  if another entrepreneur  has already entered, if there has 
in fact been a prior entrant, it enters too. But then any prior potential entrant, knowing 
that the N'th entrepreneur  will follow,  enters and obtains net utility of v — C too.  The 
result is that the first N entrepreneurs enter. For sufficiently small v — e no more than N 
firms enter because the N + l'st entrant would be sure to suffer a loss in utility. 
1.2. Case (ii): N < 2 
This is the second major  case, the natural monopoly case, where it is impossible for 
two firms to both produce at minimum efficient scale S and also sell at the competitive 
price w + it. In this  case the industry  is not viable under laissez faire.  The reason is that, 
as we saw above, there is no equilibrium in which  workers become trained when there is 
a single firm.  We also demonstrated  that firms cannot break even when the number of 
'lnfe.ct, it i  not fl*0..ry  for the .equenc  of movie  to be exogenoully epecified. Ai long a' there ii an interval of tune 
during which  entry can like place, if  firm, endogenoucly  acted ahin to enter  the lame outcome  re,ulti. FaXTelt  and Siloner 
(1985)  alec .ho that etr.e  p0hz can have .uentially the lame effect a' eequedaah entry to their model. 
11 existing  firms N exceeds N. Therefore,  equilibria with more than one active firm also fail 
to exist. 
1.3. Discussion 
The results of the model can be summarized as follows.  If D(w + h) ￿  2S, the 
competitive  outcome emerges.  The social marginal resource  costs are w + h, and the 
competitive output when price is equal  to those costs is D(  w  h)  The number  of workers 
who become trained is exactly sufficient to produce that quantity, the maximum number 
of entrepreneurs  who can create firms that produce at minimum efficient scale enter, and 
competition  among them drives the wage up to w±h. If, on the other  hand, D(w  +  h) <2S 
so that demand cannot support two firms operating at minimum efficient scale  when  price 
is equal to marginal costs (including training),  the industry is not viable.  No firms enter 
and the good is not produced.  This outcome results because the firm cannot commit not 
to exploit the workers once they  have obtained their training, and hence they have no 
incentive to become trained. 
This latter conclusion hinges critically on our assumption  that workers choose their 
training before they have had any formal relationship with the firm.  We are thus ruling 
out any initial long term contract  which  guarantees the workers a wage of w +  h if they do 
become trained. Similarly, we  are ruling out arrangements in which the firm trains workers 
at a cost of h to itself. In the presence of  such employer-provided training the wage could 
be w and the allocation would be the same as when the worker is sure to be paid w + h if 
he becomes  trained. 
Our assumption that these alternative  arrangements  are impossible is only a conve- 
nient simplification.  We expect that similar conclusions would follow in the more  realistic 
setting where  such contracts are possible but involve a variety of costs which are absent 
when (as in the case of multiple firms) the workers make their own training decisions. 
Such costs arise because  long-term contracts that specify future payments  as  a function 
of worker training are hard to enforce and because it is difficult for firms themselves to 
provide the appropriate  training. 
Consider first the "solution"  where the firms assume responsibility for the training 
12 of the workers, i.e., they train their workers at a cost per worker of h to the firm.  The 
immediate problem with this is that the workers may not all be equally suited  for training 
or may need different types of training. For instance, training may improve the skill of 
some workers but not that of others. if workers know whether training will improve their 
skill ex ante while firms only discover this ex post, the equilibria with two firms considered 
above induce the right workers to obtain training. By contrast, if the firm pays all workers 
w ex post and simply pays for their training, it is likely to obtain a rather mixed group  of 
trainees.8 
Similar  problems  arise if the firm signs a contract  committing  it to pay w + h to 
workers who obtain training. The difficulty here is in defining "training" in a way that is 
contractually  implementable if the contract only specifies that a specific training course 
must  be taken, then the difficulty is the same  as when the firm provides the training 
course itself:  adverse selection results in the "wrong" workers becoming trained. Instead, 
the firm might try to write a contract that specifies a required level of acquired skill, The 
problem here is that it is much more difficult for a third party to verify skill itself than 
the completion of some training course,  So, the workers cannot be sure that the firm will 
not attempt to exploit them ex post by claiming that they  are insufficiently skilled and 
therefore do not qualify for a skilled wage. 
2. General Equilibrium Models 
In this section we consider general equilibrium models in which trade among regions 
arises precisely because  workers only obtain training if they can be sure of competition 
among firms located within the region in which they work.  We show that equilibrium  can 
entail the emergence of "developed" regions that trade high wage goods among themselves 
and who also trade th'ir high wage goods for the low wage goods of "undeveloped" regions. 
We build up to a model with three regions and two high wage goods,  by first consid- 
ering two simpler models.  in Section 2.1 we consider a model with two regions and two 
goods.  We derive conditions  under which equilibrium entails one developed region which 
'In prsctãc. tho.. volunteering  to join •  treining progrem could  vol1  end up being tho.e Iet  euithte for trrnrng. They 
c  likely  to include thoee  .tho  re unemployed presely beceuse  they &re not very erntable. 
13 produces a high wage good of the kind we analyzed above, and which exports it to the 
undeveloped region which produces only a low wage good. In Section 2.2 we then consider 
a model with two regions and two high wage goods.  We derive conditions  under which 
each region specializes in one of the high wage goods, exporting  it to the other. Finally, 
in Section 2.3, we combine these elements in considering a model with three regions hut 
only two high wage goods. 
2.1. A Model with Two Regions and Two Goods 
One of the two goods, good Y, is of the kind analyzed above: it can only be produced 
by workers who have received training,  each skilled worker can produce a single unit of Y, 
and there is a minimum efficient scale S. The  other good, Z, which acts ss the numeraire, 
is also produced with constant returns  to scale but there is no minimum efficient scale. 
One unskilled worker can produce  so units of good Z.  Good Z serves as a competitively 
supplied good that is produced in both regions.  The presence of such a common good 
ensures that, in some sense at least,  workers are paid the same  in both regions.  As in 
Heipman and Krugmao (1989) the presence of this good achieves at least a limited form 
of factor price equalization. 
There are M workers in each region, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelas- 
tically.  These workers are geographically immobile, they can only produce  in their own 
region.  We assume  that M > 2S  so that there are sufficient workers for two firms to 
produce at minimum  efficient  scale in each region. 
Each individual's  utility function is given by: 
U(C) + C  — Fe hit 
— IceS + cc,,v  (5) 
where C represents the consumption of good i. The ic's are indicator  variables; irk is one 
if the individual becomes trained,  it0 is one if he becomes an entrepreneur,  ic,, is one if the 
individual who has become an entrepreneur produces at least S units. Hereafter we shall 
assume that v — e is arbitrarily small. 
Goods are costly to transport between regions. In particular, an amount t of good Z 
is spent when one unit of  good Y is transported  from one  region to  the  other.9 Thus a well 
9For simplicity  ws  igoose  tramport  costs on good 5. 
14 meaning social planner would avoid interregional trade, if possible.  Assuming an interior 
solution where both goods are produced, a Pareto Optimal allocation where each region 
is self sufficient would have C, set at a level where  marginal utility equals marginal  cost, 
i.e., where U'(C) = w + h. Such a Pareto Optimum would therefore  involve training L* 
individuals  in each region where  L* satisfies: 
(6) 
since L*/M is the per capita consumption  of good Y.  Finally, since entrepreneurs  derive 
utility from owning active firms, this production  should be spread across as many firms  of 
minimum  efficient scale as possible.1° 
Note that our assumptions  on preferences make this general equilibrium  model  es- 
sentially identical to the partial equilibrium model of section 1. If we write d(p) for the 
amount demanded  by each individual as a function of the price, then utility maximization 
implies U'(d,,)  = p, or d(p) = U''. Since there are M individuals in each region, the 
aggregate amount of Y demanded in one region as a function of price is now given by 
D = Md = MU'1 = M() = L.  (7) 
For  both goods  to actually  be produced in positive  quantities  at the Pareto Optimal 
allocation it must be possible to satisfy the  total domestic demand  for  good Y by employing 
domestic workers. This requires that L* be no greater than M. 
We now analyze the conditions under  which  equilibria exist which result in the Pareto 
Optimal allocation,  and those under which equilibrium involves interregional trade.  We 
assume free entry into the production of good Z so that the wage in terms of Z is w. 
The issue then is how many firms enter industry Y.  As before we assume that entry 
decisions are made first. There are two main cases to consider, depending on whether or 
not L > 2S. 
2.1.1. Case (i): L  > 25 
When  L exceeds 25 there is sufficient demand  for two firms to produce at minimum 
efficient scale in both regions. There is then an autarkic equilibrium in which  each region 
'°Noto thM if  —  e 1. Ie.rge,  the Pareto Optimum would involve  creating  even more  Snua and having  them produce at 
than minimum  efficient irate in order to allow more individuale  to experience  the joy of entrepreneurahip 
15 has N = int(Lt/S) active  firms.  Once N firms have entered,  L  workers are happy to 
obtain training and the firms have enough workers to produce at minimum efficient scale. 
The Farrell and Saloner (i988)  reasoning we  employed in the previous section implies that 
this is the only autarkic equilibrium. The Pareto Optimal  outcome is thus an equilibrium 
when trade is  impossible.  It obviously remains  an equilibrium  when trade is allowed 
between regions  since there is no incentive to for interregional trade at this equilibrium. 
Even though the Pareto Optimal outcome is an equilibrium,  there may also exist 
another class of equilibria when there is free trade, These equilibria have regional agglom- 
eration; one of the regions produces all of good Y and the other produces only Z. These 
are the only other equiiibria.  In particular there do not exist equilibria in which one of the 
regions both produces some of Y domestically and also imports some.  To see why, suppose 
to the contrary that there are two firms producing Y in one of the regions and that this 
region aiso imports Y.  Suppose workers in the exporting  region earn w + h.  Then, wages 
must equal w + h  t in the importing region. But that would mean that more workers in 
the importing  region would obtain training. Similarly, if the wage in the importing region 
is w +  h it is less than that in the exporting  region and workers do not have an incentive 
to become trained there. 
The agglomerated  equilibria,  if they exist,  can be of two types depending  on the 
magnitude of M.  The first applies when M is "large"  in a sense to be made  precise 
shortly. Then, the firms in the region that produces V pay their workers a wage of w + h 
and charge w + It.  Denote the producing  region as the foreign region while home is 
the importing  region.  The landed cost  (including transportation) in the home region is 
to + It + 2,  so that home demand is MU"1(w + It  t). Aggregate demand at a price of 
to + It is therefore given by: 
M[Lfl_1(w+h+t) 
(w + It  2)  =MU  (w+h)(1+A),  where  Ass 
LTh-l(w±It) 
'  (8) 
= (1  A)L*,  since  MU°"(w + It) = L*. 
The  parameter  A  represents  the per capita consumption  of the high wage good in the 
16 importing  region relative to that in the producing region.  Since U'1 is decreasing in its 
argument, A is less than one. This is merely a. reflection of the fact that transportation 
costs raise prices for the high wage good in the importing region above w + h so that per 
capita consumption of it is lower there. 
The maximum number  of firms that can  operate abroad at minimum efficient scale 
is given by int[(1 + A)L"/5J. This is therefore the number of entrepreneurs  that enter in 
the agglomerated equilibrium.  It is now clear what it means for M to be large:  For this 
type of equilibrium  to exist M must exceed (I + A)L".  Otherwise, even if all available 
workers seek training,  the market clearing price exceeds w + h. Such is the situation in the 
other type of agglomerated equilibria which arise when M is less than (1 + A)L*, These 
agglomerated equilibria, if they exist, have higher wages and prices. 
In order for an equilibrium with agglomeration of either type to exist the transporta- 
tion cost, t, must not be "too large". The reason is that, if t is high, the price of Y in the 
importing region is high as  well. Such high prices create an incentive for two firms to enter 
and produce 2S. This incentive is even higher when M is less than (1 + A)L" since, in this 
case, the price exceeds w + h in the exporting region as well. For purposes of illustrating 
these incentives we thus focus on the case where M exceeds (1 + A)L". 
Suppose, for argument's  sake, that the exporting region produces (1 + A)L* and that 
two entrepreneurs enter  in the importing  region and produce  S each.  Output in that region 
is 25 which, by assumption  is less than L*. The equilibrium price  can now have one of two 
forms  depending on the sign of U'(25) 
— U'(L * (1 + A)) 
— t, If it is negative, the difference 
between the prices in two regions when each region consumes its entire production  is less 
than t.  Thus there is no incentive to trade in this case; the price in the home region is 
U'(2S) and that in the foreign region is U'(L" (I + A)). If, instead,  U1(2S) 
— U'(L  * (1 +  A)) 
is greater than t, there would be an incentive to trade if both regions consume their entire 
production  of Y. Therefore, the home region imports  some of good Y and the equilibrium 
price abroad Pf is between U'(2S) and U'(L * (1 + A)) while that at home equals F' +  t. 
In this case: 
M{U'1(F1 + t) + U'_1 (F')] = (I + A)L" + 2S. 
17 If t is zero and  S > 0, the equilibrium is of this second type and Pt exceeds w + It. 
However, the  larger  is 2, the  more likely that the resulting  equilibrium with trade has pf t 
bigger than  w +  It or that U'(2S) 
— U'(L  * (1 +  A)) —i is negative. In either case the domestic 
price exceeds w + It so two entrepreneurs  can enter in the importing  region, produce at 
minimum efficient scale, offer  their workers w + It, and make nonnegative profits.  But 
then the Farrell and Saloner reasoning implies that they will enter. There thus cannot be 
agglomeration of the production  of Y in one region if 2  is sufficiently big.1t 
Similarly, for a given 2, there always exists a sufficiently small (t) such that for S 
smaller than ,(t), pf +  2 is larger than w  It.  Thus, the findings of this subsection can 
be summarized as follows: if S is small relative to 2 the unique equilibrium is autarkic, 
otheowise there are multiple equilibria:  both the autarkic equilibrium  and equilibria  in 
which one of the regions specializes in the production  of Y exist. We argue in our section 
on gains from trade (and prove in Appendix C) that if workers also make their training 
decisions sequentially  in each region,  the Farrell and Saloner reasoning eliminates the 
equilibria with  agglomeration.  Thus  the autarkic equilibria are more robust when L' > 25. 
2.1.2, Case (ii): L* <2S 
As long as Lt exceeds 5, the Pareto Optimal allocation with no trade is still feasible. 
However since L' < 25, it is not possible for two firms to operate at minimum efficient 
scale in each region and so, for the reasons explored in Section 1, there is no laissez-faire 
equilibrium in which the good is produced  by each region for its own consumption. 
The only possible equilibria  where good Y is supplied  in positive quantities must 
therefore have only one  region supplying the good, as in the equilibrium with  agglomeration 
of the previous subsection,  For such an equilibrium to exist here aggregate demand at a 
price of w + It must exceed the sum of the firms' minimum efficient scales, i.e., we must 
have (1 + A)L ￿  2S. 
Compared  to autarky,  trade for these parameter values is clearly beneficial to both 
regions.  Under autarky, since U <25, the regions do not get to consume good Y at all. 
The change from autarky to free trade  keeps the  wages of  workers the same. On the  other 
"A  .imiIaz irguineM deznon,frate. that such agglomeration  ii imponible (even for sero tI if  M  is substantially smaller  than 
(1 + x)L'. 
18 hand consumers gain the consumer surplus: 
j  [U'(a)_(w+h)da  (9) 
in the producing  region and j  [U'(a) -  (w + h + t)  do  (10) 
in the other region. 
Trade  is driven by external returns. The presence of  numerous trained workers makes 
it possible for the two firms producing good Y to be viable in one region.  Similarly, the 
assurance of competition among firms makes training worthwhile for workers.  However, 
the external returns are not the usual ones. They might rather be viewed as a pecuniary 
externality: The presence of another firms affects the competition  for workers and this 
makes workers available to both firms  where one firm cannot obtain workers by itself. 
Figure  1 is useful for describing the outcomes as  L*/S varies.  The Pareto Optimal 
allocation  involves no trade as long as L*/S  1.  However  we can support the Pareto 
Optimal allocation without trade as an equilibrium  only if L/S is greater than 2.12  The 
reason is that otherwise  we cannot have two active firms in each region, and with only 
one firm there is not sufficient competition  for skilled workers.  When La/S is between 
2/  (1 + A) and 2 the equilibrium has positive production  of good Y in one region. In this 
region, the equilibrium  has international  trade even though the Pareto Optimal  allocation 
is feasible and does not involve  trade. The reason for this is that it is necessary for a region 
to produce a relatively large amount of the good for there to be effective competition for 
workers. 
For L/S between I and 2/(1 + A), by contrast,  the Pareto Optimal allocation has 
production  in both regions while the equilibrium  involves production in neither.  This 
region arises because  A is strictly  less than one.  Put differently, the costs of trade raise 
prices in the region that does not produce the good above w + h.  This reduces sales of Y 
and makes it more difficult for both firms in the  producing region to exceed their minimum 
efficient scale. 
k3For u5kie*Iy 1rge L/S thi, ii th  only ,qnhbrum. 
19 The Pareto Optimal allocation continues to involve positive production for certain 
values of L*/S below 1. Let  denote the highest S for  which the Pareto Optimal  allocation 
involves positive production.  Then L/ is smaller than 1/(i + A).  But for L/S between 
1/Cl + A) and 1 there is no production without  government intervention. 
2.L3. The Gains from Trade 
When L is less than 2S trade is beneficial in that the regions can consume the good 
with trade but not without trade.  When L is greater  than 2S, the autarkic allocation 
remains an equilibrium  even with free trade.  This does not establish  that free trade is as 
good as autarky in this case because, for sufficiently low transportation  costs, there also 
exist equilibria, where  only one  region produces good Y. In these equilibria the importing 
region is worse off. 
These losses  from trade as a result of multiple equilibria are analogous to those ex- 
plored by Graham (1923), Melvin (1969), Markusen and Melvin (1981) and Ethier (1982). 
A slight difference with Ethier (1982) is that he obtains losses from trade only when the ex- 
porting region is ful'!y specialized in the production of the good  subject to external returns. 
These losses are analogous to those we obtain in the absence of transport costs when M 
is less than (1 + A)L*. They come about because, in this case, the price in the exporting 
region exceeds the autarky price w  h.  In our model with transport costs, by contrast, 
we obtain losses from trade even when the exporting region is not fully specialized. 
The equilibria in which trade leads to losses rely on a coordination failure. Workers in 
the importing region do not believe that other workers will enter in sufficient numbers to 
make the industry  viable.  This leads them not to get trained when they expect  (1 +  A)L* 
workers to get trained in the other region.  Because these equilibria rely on the inability 
of workers to communicate to each other  their willingness to become trained one would 
expect them not to be robust to changes in the informational structure. This is what we 
argue next. 
Following Farrell and Saloner (1985) we  capture the possibility that workers can com- 
municate  to each other their intentions by assuming that they take the  decision to become 
trained in sequence. First one worker has the option  of  becoming trained, then another and 
20 so on. Once a worker becomes trained this becomes known to all other potential trainees. 
To ensure that the two regions are treated symmetrically we assume that the location  of 
the worker who has the option of becoming trained alternates  between the two regions. 
First one worker in one region has the option, then a worker in the other region and so on. 
We show in Appendix C that  if training  decisions take  this form, the autarkic equilibria 
are the only equilibria when L* > 25.  Thus, with this small modification in the game, 
trade is always beneficial. 
2.2. A Symmetric Two-Region Version 
The outcome involving trade is the previous subsection is asymmetric: only one region 
produces good Y and, because of the transport costs, ends up slightly better  off as a result. 
We now present  a symmetric version of the two-region model which has two high-wage 
goods. 
The technology for producing goods Y and Z remains the same as before. There is 
now also a third good, X, whose technology is identical to that of good Y.  Thus there are 
now two goods which are produced  by a relatively small number  of large firms employing 
specialized labor. 
The preferences of the representative  worker are now given by: 
U(C) + U(C) + C  — ,chh 
— e5e + ?cV  (U) 
A benevolent central planner would avoid the transport costs on goods X and Y by 
having 2L  trained workers in each region, half of whom produce good X while the other 
half produce good Y.  Again, however, if L is smaller than 25, there is  no equilibrium 
where both goods are produced in both regions.  The only equilibria where  goods X and 
Y are produced  involve regional specialization even though this specialization leads to the 
expenditure of transport costs. 
In this model with two goods, it is much less likely that one region will produce all 
the goods requiring  the input of trained workers. The reason is that if 2(1 +  ))L* > M no 
region has enough workers to supply both goods X and Y to the entire world. Then, the 
only equilibrium  where both goods are produced  has two specialized regions which trade 
- 
21 with each other. One region produces the world's demand  for good X and the other the 
world's demand for good Y 
2.3. An Asymmetric Model with Three Regions 
Combining elements developed in each of the previous subsections, we now show that 
our model is capable of explaining the coexistence of multiple "developed"  regions and 
an "undeveloped" region in which the "developed regions" export high wage goods to the 
less developed region, and also trade with each other. The less developed region has lower 
wages than the developed region. Moreover workers employed in the export sector of the 
developed region earn wages that are higher than the average for the region as a whole. 
To derive these results we consider a model in which there exist the same three goods 
X, Y and Z but where there are three identical regions.  Demand in any one region for 
X (or Y) at a price of w + h is too small for two firms to produce at minimum  efficient 
scale (i.e., L  < 2S), but the overall demand from all three regions is sufficient to do so 
((1 + 2A)L ￿  2S).  Moreover, 2(1 + 2A)L*,  the aggregate demand for both X and Y, 
exceeds M, so that no one region can produce both on a world scale. 
Then the only equilibrium  where all three goods get produced has two "developed" 
regions each of which exports one high wage good and imports the other, and one "less 
developed" region which imports both X and Y.  All three regions produce good Z.  In 
what follows we  refer to the region that produces X (Y) as Region X (Y), and the  region 
that produces only Z as Region Z. 
To develop implications for wages, note first that some workers in the developed region 
earn w while other earn w + h. This means that the average wage in the region exceeds 
that in the undeveloped region where all workers earn w.  Moreover, the wage of those 
employed in the exporting region of the developed region is w + h so that it exceeds the 
average wage in the region. 
This is also an implication of the symmetric model of the previous subsection.  This 
implication  of these models is consistent with the evidence of Katz and Summers (1q89). 
They find that, in industrialized  countries, the average wage paid by a country's exporting 
industries exceeds the average wage paid in that country's  manufacturing  sector as a whole. 
22 Our model also gives some guidance as to why Katz and Summers (1989) and others 
have  found it  difFicult  to account for inter-industry wage differences by looking at differences 
in the  amount of  formal education  the workers in different industries possess. In our  model, 
wages are determined by industry-specific skill which is often obtained in ways other than 
through formal education. For example, workers often acquire those skills on the job.'3 
This could explain  why the wages of workers who move from one industry to another 
change in ways that are related to the inter-industry wage differentials. Workers who have 
acquired some industry-specific skill in one industry  and move to another where those skills 
are not valued, will experience a reduction  in their wages.  Conversely, workers who have 
acquired skills that are not valued in the industry in which they are currently employed 
but which are valuable  in the one they move to will raise their wages by moving. 
3. Industrial/Commercial Policy 
In our models the production  of some goods involves high wages while that of other 
goods does not.  In such contexts, protection  has been viewed as beneficial by numerous 
authors e.g. Hagen (1958), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), Katz and Summers (1989).) 
We are thus led to explore whether a region can gain by unilaterally deviating from free 
trade. 
We consider  two types of deviations.  In the first, which we call industrial  policy, the 
central authority attempts to encourage the emergence of a specifically targeted industry. 
In the second, the central authority is not interested  in changing the pattern of regional 
specialization but  nonetheless taxes imports whose production requires skilled labor.  While 
industrial  policy often involves the use of tariffs, we distinguish between the two policies 
because the first tries to affect the composition of trade without trying to affett its level 
while the second affects mainly the level. 
3.1. Industrial  Policy. 
Industrial policy can be carried out using various tools.  One approach is to give a 
subsidy to firms who produce the desired good. Suppose, for example, that we are in the  '  Of coull. one  might attempt to control for that in part by including yearn of experience' v.ri  able. in the regrcean,  ae Ic 
typically done. However  euch vwaee do not identify  time epent on the job acquiring indcetry-  .paciftc .kiii. 
23 simple case ofSection  2.1 where there are two regions but only a single high wage good. 
The central authority  in one region, acting unilaterally, can ensure  that the high wage good 
is produced locally by offering a subsidy to firms who produce the good.  In particular, 
suppose it announces that in the event  that the domestic firms face foreign competition 
they will receive a per unit subsidy, u, which is such that 
= to  /t — MU''((l + A)L°).  (12) 
Then, two firms will be willing to enter the domestic market and to produce enough output 
to satis' world demand even if they do not in fact end up exporting at all in equilibrium. 
The reason for this is that if the foreign market is somehow foreclosed to them, equilibrium 
in the domestic market  will entail an equilibrium price of P° = MU'1((1 + A)L°)  and a 
wse equal to to  /t14 
No foreign firms  will  enter this market if they  know that the domestic firms have 
been offered this subsidy.  They will decide to stay out of the market since they will be 
unable to export and their domestic  market is not sufficiently large to support minimum 
efficient scale production for two firms.  Therefore, if the central authority announces its 
subsidy  plan before any entry decisions are made, the outcome  will be that the domestic 
firms will be the sole world producers of the high wage good. Moreover, since the central 
authority only had to commit to paying the subsidy in the event that foreign competition 
materialized, domestic dominance of the industry  is achieved without any subsidy  actually 
being paid ft quihbrium. 
This outcome is desirable from the perspective of  domestic residents since the utility 
of the region that produces the high wage good is higher than the utility in the other 
region.  In the symmetric model of Section 2.2, however, the subsidy to one good makes 
no difference.  There each region can only produce one high wage good and that is the 
equilibrium outcome with or without the offer of the subsidy  on a single good.  While the 
UT0 gee thia note Snt that donoeotio  consornera are willing to  000oorno (1 + AL  at a price of Mt7't(l + AlL'. The revenue 
per unit that the firms receive (incinding  the euheidy)  to 
MU''(I  + A)L' + w + S — ?rJ'1(1 +  A)L  = w +  It, 
Thuo  the fir  are willing to bid the wage  up tow + S and so worSen are prepared to obtain training. 
24 subsidy can determine which of the high wage goods the domestic industry produces by 
"targeting"  that good, the country is indifferent in that model as to which of the goods it 
produces. 
In a slightly richer model, however, the subsidy  can be socially costly.  Suppose, for 
example, that foreign workers can more easily  become trained  than domestic workers. This 
could arise for example where the high wage good involves a new  technology and where 
the  workers of the foreign country  have built up some relevant industry-specific know-how 
with the old technology.  In that case efficiency may call for production to be done by 
foreign firms whereas the offer of a subsidy may lead to the emergence (and dominance) 
of a domestic industry.  Not only would foreign consumers be hurt by this since they must 
bear the transportation  costs, but even domestic consumers may be hurt.  While they save 
the transportation cost they would otherwise have to pay, they  now pay for the higher 
training costs of the domestic workers. The industrial policy can also be implemented by 
imposing a prohibitive import tariff on the targeted good. By announcing the tar.ff before 
foreign firms make their entry decisions, and thereby convi'ving  them that the domestic 
market  is foreclosed to them, they can be deterred  from entering.  The end result, again, 
will be the emergence of domestic firms as the sole world producers of the good. This is a 
simple case of "import protection leads to export promotion" 
3.2. Nondiscriminatory Import Taxes 
In this section we study tariffs which reduce the volume of trade but do not affect the 
pattern of specialization.  This analysis is thus closer in spirit to traditionai analyses of 
tariffs which are conducted assuming that a country  will continue to import the good on 
which a tariff has been levied. 
To make sense of such policies in the context of our model it might be best to have 
in mind the symmetric model of section 2.2 with M less than 2(1 + A)L, In that model 
free trade has one of the high wage goods, X produced by one region while the other, 
Y is produced by the other. Suppose that, as described in the previous subsection,  one 
region imposes a prohibitive tariff on good X so that it is sure to export X. The analysis 
'°S.s Kruginsn (1584) for th. oriin1 .tatement of thu  poulbUity. 
25 of this subsection then corresponds to the analysis of relatively small tariffs on V levied 
by the other region.  Such moderate tariffs on V will not affect the regional pattern of 
specialization in this case. 
We show that the benefits from  tariffs depends  critically, as in Lapan (1988), on 
whether  the government that imposes the tariff takes  the agents in the other country 
by "surprise", In our model this depends,  in particular, on whether workers in the for- 
eign country  correctly predict the imposition of the tariffs when they make their training 
decisions. 
Suppose first that the foreign workers do not correctly anticipate the imposition of 
the tariffs. Then (1 + A)L"  of them become trained for the production of V.  A tariff on 
imports  of V lowers the demand  for V. Thus, for the market to clear the equilibrium price 
for Y must be less than it'  h and the wage of  foreign trained workers will therefore  also be 
beow w  h.  As long as the tariff is not too large, so that the wage for trained  workers still 
exceeds to, the skilled workers will prefer to be employed producing V and its output will 
not change.  Because the tariff lowers the price charged by the foreign firms, small tariffs 
on imports of V helps the domestic region. This is the standard optimal  tariff argument. 
Now suppose that workers in the foreign region do correctly anticipate  the imposition 
of the tariff when they make their training decisions.  Since they correctly anticipate  the 
reduction  in demand that will follow the imposition of the tariff,  fewer  of them obtain 
training. Indeed, the number of foreigners that obtains training adjusts until their wages 
equal w + h and the price charged abroad equals to + h.  If the ex post tariff is r, the 
number of workers that obtain training is: 
MU''(w  h) + Muv_1((1 + r)(w + fi +t)).  (13) 
Since the price charged  abroad is thus independent  of the anticipated tariff rate, 
domestic residents lose from the tariff. Domestic consumption falls and the unit price paid 
to the foreign firms is unchanged.  Domestic residents would be better off if the country 
could commit  never to levy a tariff. 
These conclusions are similar to, though stronger, than Lapan's.  Lapan (1988) shows 
that when  the production of output occurs before a government can  levy a tariff,  the 
26 incentive to raise tariffs  is  larger  ex post than ex ante.  However, his framework is one 
where  countries trade because  they are intrinsically different. As a result, in his model a 
small tariff is desirable even ex ante.  Here, by contrsst, all tariffs are undesirable ex ante 
so countries are sure to gain by committing themselves never to levy a tariff in the future. 
One resson to stress  these  results  is that  they differ radically from those  of the standard 
models that explain trade among similar countries.  Standard models of this type stress 
increasing returns and monopolistic competition as motives for trade among regions  As 
can  be  seen in Gros (1987), Venables (1987)  and Helpman and Krugman  (19S9'. ur.der 
these assumptions  tariffs are generally desirable even whin they are correctly antiripaed. 
What we have  shown is that Lapan's (1988) case against  tariffs applies even more strongly 
in a model where Identical countries trade with each other. 
4. Antitrust  Policy 
In the models we have presented the perfectly competitive  outcome emerges even  if 
there are only two competing rivais.  In practice, however,  paucity of competitors  may 
endow the firms tn the industry with market power over their customers and suppliers. 
In particular, the firms may be able to restrict their consumption  of inputs and thereby 
reduce the amount they pay to their input suppliers. 
This can  occur, for example, when firms interact repeatedly  and implicitly collude. 
Suppose in particular that after entrepreneurs  have entered and workers have obtained 
training, prices are set and demand is realized over many periods.  Then the firms may 
be able to implement a collusive norm in which wages  are set below the competitive level. 
That norm may be sustainable  if firms fear that any unilateral deviation from the norm 
will lead to a breakdown in cooperation in which wages return to the competitive level.16 
Each firm would then weigh the short term gain from offering a slightly higher wage while 
others keep their wages at the collusive level, with the future loss that results from the 
elimination of the collusive gain.  The result is that, as long as the number of firms is not 
too large, they obtain an outcome that is similar to that of perfect collusion. To keep the 
discussion manageable we will assume that as long as no more than S firms are present 
"See  Fried,nsz, (tan) fort thecry slong then tines for cohesion  in output prices. 
27 they achieve the fully collusive outcome; the pay their workers to and  charge a price given 
by (4).  By contrast,  if there are more than 1  firms, the competitive  outcome obtains. 
We are interested in examining the effect of a strong antitrust policy.  We focus in 
particular  on the vigor with which merger policy is established and enforced.17 We assume 
that, initially, there are N > S firms. The more vigorous the antitrust enforcement, the 
less likely it is that a set of mergers Will  be tolerated  which reduce the number  of firms in 
an industry to  or fewer, Let the probability that the antitrust authorities  will prevent 
3uch an increase in concentration  be given by p. That is, p. denotes the probability  that 
competition will characterize the industry  and (1 
— p) is the probability  that the firms will 
collude perfectly and drive the wage down to to, 
We suppose that the initial number of firms, N, is such that they  can all operate 
at efficient scale when the price is to'  h.  For it to be worthwhile for workers to obtain 
training they must expect to earn to  h on average.  Since they earn to when antitrust 
enforcement is lax, they must earn to  h/p when antitrust enforcement is vigorous. Since 
the wage and price are equal In equilibrium when firms are competing, this implies that 
the price equais to + h/p as well when there is effective competition. 
In order for the trained  workers to be fully employed in the event that antitrust policy 
is vigorous, the number of  workers that seek training must equal D(w + h/p.). Therefore, 
the number of workers who obtain training  is decreasing in the probability that antitrust 
policy enables the firms to collude, (1 
— p.): A higher probability of collusion means that 
fewer workers obtain training. In the limit, if the probability of collusion is one (so that p 
equais zero), no worker becomes trained. 
When the firms collude they set a wage of to and hire all the trained workers. Thus 
sales equal  D(w  h/p.)  and the price must  again equal to  h/p.  So the potential for 
collusion raises the price whether collusion takes place or not. 
We now consider international  trade.  Suppose that,  as  in the model of Section 2.1 
there are two regions but only one high wage good. Suppose that in the domestic region 
"In lbs U.S., for example,  the Department  of Justice has considerable  latitude in deciding  which mergers it will challente 
and has set out 'Onidelines' it uses in reaching  those deoisioss.  The guidelines  are subject to  reviuion and those in effect at 
any tune isacs  substaostial  room  for interpretstioo. Accordingly  merger  policy  can fluctuate substantially from administration 
to  adoniniutratioo. 
28 the probability  of collusion is zero.  By contrast,  in the foreign region the probability of 
competition  ,u is  less than one i.e., the foreign region has a weak antitrust policy  Then, 
for a sufficiently 8mall (but strictly positive) foreign j. the foreign  region  must become the 
importer of good Y. 
This can be seen as follows. Suppose first that the foreign region is the only producer 
of Y. Then the total number of trained  workers abroad L1 is MU'(w  hji)  - 
h/ji + tj which is decreasing in .  So, for sufficiently low : 
M[U''(w  h)  U't(w m h + t> L + 2S. 
Then, 2S workers find it profitable to become trained  at home  if two firms enter here. 
Knowing this two  firms do enter and the foreign wage falls below w  even  when 
foreign firms compete.  But, this means that in this case foreign workers do not benefit 
from obtainrng  training.  The only equilibrium has the domestic region, with is tough 
antitrust stance, exporting  the high wage good, 
Thus the country with the vigorous antitrust policy  is  better off than the country 
in which  collusion is tolerated, This simple example sugges.  that relaxation of antitrust 
rules, particularly in industries where human capital accumulation is important,  can weli 
be detrimental  to a region's welfare. Insofar as cooperation  between firms allows  them to 
exploit workers more ex post, fewer workers will obtain training and the region will suffer. 
This concern for a strong antitrust policy in order to ensure  vigorous competition between 
purchasers  of inputs echoes that of Porter (1989)  who makes this argument  strongly for 
similar reasons. 
This result may appear surprising because in the usual models of external  returns 
cooperation  among firms  is  beneficial.  When  the externality is technological, so that 
increased output by one firm reduces the inputs needed by another, an agreement between 
the firms is beneficial since it allows the firms to internalize the externality,  leading to a 
socially desirable output expansion.  Similarly, in the case of  localized knowledge spillovers, 
research joint ventures  may improve social welfare.  By enabling all the members of the 
joint venture to benefit from the research carried out by them in the joint venture, the 
externality from research  is mitigated.  Indeed,  this is precisely the argument  used by 
29 .Jorde and Teece (1988)18 Our paper serves as a warning that the appearance  of external 
returns is not enough to justify cooperation  among firms.  In particular, although very 
large research consortia might lead to greater sharing of the fruits of the research,  they 
may also reduce the compensation of their employees, and thus reduce their incentive to 
acquire the knowledge and the skills needed to conduct the research. 
5, Conclusions 
We have presented  a model of regional agglomeration in the production of specific 
goods where the principal motor behind  a region's exports is the healthy competition 
among many suppliers located there.  Competition ensures that workers earn high wages 
if they acquire industry-specific human capital which, in turn, makes human capital accu- 
mulation attractive and the industry  viable. 
The main message from the model is that even where it is technolocaliy possible 
to obtain the same allocation with trade as without trade, trade serves a useful role.  It 
allows  industries  to operate on a sufficiently large scale that it is possible to have several 
firms producing the same goods in one location and thereby reap the benefits that flow 
from regional agglomeration. 
While we have focused on the salutary effect of regional agglomeration on the abuse 
of monopsony power, there may  be other  reasons why regional  agglomeration enhances 
human capital accumulation.  That is, it is an open question whether the mechanism by 
which having  several local firms creates an incentive for human capital accumulation  is 
through the Lcreased competition they generate. 
For example, a different advantage of regional agglomeration may be that it provides 
some assurance to workers that they will remain employable in the industry if conditions 
change in the future. That is, workers may prefer it if there is a diverse range of activities 
in the area that use their industry specific skills in case demand  conditions or production 
techniques change in a way that eliminates the activity they  choose to be employed in. 
This preference for diversity might exist even if long-term wage contracts can be written  ' 
[W]e point out that our  antitrust policy  ... imposes  unnecessary  restrictions  on high technology  industries  In our  view 
strict antitrust enforcement  is generally  not needed in the circumstances  we contemplate, because  international competition 
and  new  and unewected entry is especially  strong? 
30 specifying the wage that the worker will receive in a particular  activity, so that monopsony 
power is not an issue. 
Consider just three specific examples.  Workers  employed in the production of mid- 
sized automobiles may want to be located near plants that produce small automobiles in 
case demand shifts in the direction of the latter. Or  workers employed producing computers 
based on a proprietary  operating  syctem, but whose skills are not specific to that operating 
system, may prefer it if plants producing computers based  on alternative  operating  systsnr 
are located nearby  in case theirs becomes obsolete.  Finahy, is could slmpl  be 'at ne 
worker is concerned that he will not get on with his .upervisor or cworkers, and iike to 
know that if he becomes unhappy in his job that he can easily shift to another 
While the existence of  such diversity may be important  to workers making their train 
ing decisions, it is not clear why it cannot be achieved within a single enterprise.  That is. 
one firm could  encompass a range of  technologies, products,  plants, and divisions. Multiple 
firms might  have an advantage if workers are concerned about the possibility of bankruptcy 
and if two firms someh have a combined probability of ankruptry that  is lower than 
those firms would have when rolled into one.  Or it might be  that workers are concerned 
about the "corporate culture" and that it is difficult to maintain  several "cultures"  in sep- 
arate divisions within the same company. Such rationales for regional agglomeration must 
be highly speculative for the moment.  Sorting out which of them, or others not suggested 
here, can survive the scrutiny of  formal modeling is a question  that awaits future research. 
Another  open area  for research is the extent to which competition is actually  associated 
with high wages, extensive industry specific training and exports.  One problem is that, 
in practice, it is hard to gauge when an industry is relatively competitive.  Nonetheless it 
is worth providing some anecdotal  examples which appear to support the model.  First, 
centrally planned  economies have little actual competition for workers between the various 
firms and are notorious for their inability to export high  wage goods. Second, consider the 
automobile industry.  Japan, the most successful exporter of high quality mass-produced 
cars, has a relatively large number  of firms in this industry.  Similarly, Italy has several 
producers of high performance cars which are very successful exporters, In contrast, Italy 
31 has only one large mass-production  auto manufacturer,  FIAT, whose exports to the US 
are minimal.  Interpreted within the context of our model, the high performance Italian 
cars and the mass-produced Japanese can can be thought of as high quality goods which 
use relatively skilled workers while FIAT can be thought of as a lower  quality producer 
who employs less skilled workers. These anecdotes suggest that a more careful exploration 
of the empirical validity of the model is warranted. 
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__________  Eqm.  exists  without  trade 
FTn,  exists  with trade but 
is not  robust 
Eqin.  exists with trade an 
is robust 
No eqs..  exists wto 
positive prut.tio 
P.O.  involves pro ar 
—  no  trade 
P.O. involves  prodoctioo 
and  trade 
P.O. involves  no  production 
1  2  2 
s  (l*?)  S 
Figure l  Equilibriun and Pareto Optimality 
(A)  No production in Pareto  Optimum or in equilibriun 
(B)  P.O.  involves  production and trade but  there is no production in equilibrios 
(C)  Autarky  is  the  P.O.  but there is no production in equilibrium 
(D)  Autarky  is the P.O., but  equilibrium  requires  regional agglomeration and trade 
(E)  Autarky  is the P.O.  There  are multiple equilthria An agglomeration 
equilibrium  (which is not  robust)  and an  autarkic  equilibrium 
(F)  Autarky is the P.O.  and the unique  equilibrium  outcome. Appendix A 
Existence of The Competitive Equilibrium 
In this appendix we prove the assertion in Section 1 that a competitive equilibrium 
exists when 2 < N < N. 
The subgame equilibrium strategies are as follows: L workers obtain training. The 
wages that firms offer are:  (a) if L < S all firms set  sV = 0; (b) if S < L <25  one of the 
firms sets tiq = 11(L) +  and the others  set tfij = 11(L) + 
— c for c arbitrarily small;  (c) 
if 25 < L ￿  D(w  ii) there are two cases to consider: (I) N < Nt  int: In this case 
the firms set sZ,j  = 11'(L).  (ii) N > Nt: In his case Nt firms set  sD  = 11'(L) 
and the remaining firms set their wage equal to 0; (d) if 11(w + h) <L < 11(w), firms all 
set tD1  = 11'(L); and (e) If 11(w) < L firms set w = w. In case (e) a minor modification 
is required for the rule that workers use in allocating themselves across firms since there 
are too many workers to  be employed at wage w  in this industry.  Here we assume that 
L  11(w) workers elect to work in other industries. The 11(w) workers that remain in this 
industry distribute  themselves uniformly across the N firms. 
We first demonstrate  that the firms' wage strategies are equilibrium  strategies. 
Case (a):  Since here fewer than S workers obtain training, no firm is able to operate at 
minimum efficient scale. Thus they all refuse to hire workers (set ttq = 0). 
Case  (b): Since  the number  of workers who obtain training exceeds S but is less than 25, 
only one firm can operate at minimum efficient scale. Since the entrepreneur  that succeeds 
in being the one who hires the worker derives utility of  v, they are each prepared to bid v 
to the workers, or  each, for the right to be their employer. (Note that since e is a sunk 
cost at this stage it is irrelevant).  Since the market clearing price will be 111(L), the 
winning firm is willing to pay 11'(L) +  to each worker to be the sole producer. Since 
the losing firms will not attract any workers in equilibrium, they  are prepared to offer a 
tiny amount less than the wage of the "winning firm".  Doing so keeps the winning firm 
"honest" and eliminates an incentive for him to shave his wage offer. 
Case (c (H):  if  the I, workers are hired the market clearing price  will be 11(L) which exceeds 
w + h.  Since all N firms can produce at minimum efficient scale in this case, they will bid the wage up to D(L). 
Case (c(ii)):  Here there are insufficient trained workers for all N firms to operate  at 
minimum efficient scale.  N is the number of firms that can operate at minimum efficient 
scale.  As in Case (b) the entrepreneurs are willing to pay v to be successful. Since there 
are  workers per successful firm, the firms are willing to pay a "premium"  of  per 
worker to attract  them to the firm and be successful, Once the workers are all employed 
the market clearing price will be D'(L). Thus the successful firms bid D''(L) 
—  for 
workers. Unsuccessful  firms bid 0. 
Case  (d): Here  all  firms can produce at minimum efficient scale.  Once the woreLs are 
hired the market clearing price will be D'(L). Firms therefore bid the wage up to this 
level. 
Case (e): If firms offer w, workers are indifferent between being employed in this industry 
and being  employed elsewhere. Therefore it is consistent with optimizing behavior for only 
D'1(w) workers to take employment in this industry. But then the market clearing price, 
if they are employed, will be w.  Thus firms bid the wage u  to w. 
Thus the firms are willing to carry out the proposed strategies  for any number of 
workers that become trained. Those strategies  are therefore subgame perfect.  We turn 
now to the training strategy of  workers.  The proposed equilibrium strategy calls for L 
workers to obtain training. If that number obtains training,  Case (c(i)) is the relevant one 
and the wage that is offered is D..(L*) = w+h.  Since they recoup their training expenses 
the workers are prepared to obtain training. 
No additional workers are prepared to obtain training, however.  If one additional 
worker obtains training, Case  (d) becomes the relevant one.  The wage that is offered is 
+ 1) <w + h, so that the deviating  worker is unable to recoup his training costs. 
Similarly, none of the L  workers has an incentive to deviate by not obtaining training. 
Each worker who obtains training in equilibrium in indifferent between obtaining training 
at a cost h and earning  w + h and not obtaining training and earning w. Appendix B 
Uniqueness of the Competitive Equilibrium 
In this Appendix we show that the equilibrium in Section 1, where the price and wage 
equal w  h, is unique.  The proof of this proposition proceeds by contradiction  for a series 
of exhaustive cases.  Denote the price that is charged in a candidate equilibrium by P 
and the highest wage that is offered in equilibrium by iD. 
r C a'  h:  There cannot be an equilibrium where the highest wage offered to 
trained workers is less than a'  h since at least one of the workers would be able to deviate 
by not obtaining  training and make himself better off. 
(ii) ti, > a' + Ii and  Pt ￿  a' + h: In an equilibrium like this it must be the case that 
the entire  pool of untrained  workers becomes trained because tD > a' +  ii. Since the pool of 
untrained  workers is sufficient to satisfy demand when the price is a'  fi, the price must be 
below w  h for the market to clear. But then for  v — e very small at least one entrepreneur 
can make himself better off  by not entering. 
(iii)  ￿  a' + h and fi  <a' + /s:  When the price is below the wage, firms that hire 
workers lose money. But then for v — e very small at least one entrepreneur could do better 
by not entering. 
(iv)  ti'  = a' + h and E > a' + h: Here a firm will deviate and offer a wage above 
a'  fi,  The reason is that a firm can raise  the wage infinitesimally, attract all the trained 
workers and increase its profits. Appendix C 
Uniqueness of Equilibrium with Sequential Training Decisions 
In this Appendix we consider the case where L*  > 25 and workers get trained in 
sequence.  We show that, in this case, the outcome where L(1 + \) workers get trained in 
one region while none get trained in the other is not an equilibrium. The only equilibrium 
is the autarkic one where L* workers get trained in each region. 
Workers in each region are ordered from  1  to M.  The first  worker is the fl-st  to 
be given the option of becoming trained. If he declines he cannot later become 'rained 
After that,  the first worker at home is given the option, then it is given to the second 
worker abroad and so  Let s1' denote the strategy for the i'th worker at home while 
denotes the j'th foreign worker's strategy.  These strategies can take only one of two 
values; we let s equal one if the worker becomes trained and zero otherwise. The strategy 
for the i'th worker depends  only on the number of workers that have decided to become 
trained before him. Thus: 
s(=ff(4,s)  i=1...M, 
m=1  n=1  v,i=I  n=1 
Suppose that at least two firms enter in each region and that Xh workers become 
trained at home  while XI workers become trained abroad. Given our interest, assume that 
X1 exceeds Xh.  Then the equilibrium prices can be of two forms.  If U'(X') 
— U'(X1) 
is smaller than t, then the price at home is UI(Xh) while the price abroad is U'(Xf) and 
there is no trade.  if it is greater than t, good Y flows from the foreign to the domestic 
region. The equilibrium price abroad P' is bigger than U'(Xf) while the equilibrium price 
at home, Ph equals Pf +  t and is smaller than U'(X'). 
We showed in section 2.1.1 that if the equilibrium is of the former type when 2S 
workers get trained at home and as many as (1 + A)L  workers get trained abroad, the 
equilibrium is unique.  So, consider the latter equilibria, if 2S workers become trained at 
home, then no more than M[U'(w  + h) + U'1(w + h + t)J 
— 25 workers  are willing to 
become trained abroad. On the other hand, 2S workers are willing to become trained at 
The eneyiie woW4 be undanged lithe fire deciai on trenlng  were taken by the firet worker  eS home, home as long as the number  of  foreign  trained  workers does not exceed K1  M[U''  (to + 
h)  U''(w +  it — t)] 
— 25, which is larger.  The discrepancy comes  from the existence of 
transport costs whose presence ensures that the price abroad must be below to  it if it is 
to equal to + it at home. 
We now show that, if  the strategies followed by foreign workers are subgame perfect, 
at least 25 domestic workers become trained.  Consider first subgames in which fewer than 
K1 wnrkers ever become trained abroad.  Then, 25 workers  or more will become trained 
at home. To see this note that the M'th domestic worker is strictly  better off' by becoming 
trained if 25 — 1 workers got trained before him. Similarly, the M  — l'st domestic worker 
will enter if  exactly 25—2 workers got trained  before him. By doing  so he, just like the last 
worker,  recoups his training cost and lowers the equilibrium  price. This reasoning extends 
baiw  ards so that the M — 25'th worker is sure to become trained if other workers did 
not get trained before him. 
We now argue that it is impossible  for K1 workers ever to become trained abroad. 
Suppose there exists a subgame where tbe i'th foreign  worker becomes the K'  'th worker 
to become trained there.  That worker would  refrain from acquiring  training if there were 
+ it)  U°1(w + it  t)] — (K' 
— 1) = 25  1 + M[U'1(w  + it + t) — 
it — t)) domestic workers  already trained.  In equilibrium, such a number will 
always be present.  The i  — l'th domestic worker would definitely become trained if there 
were Kh — 1 domestic workers already  trained before him. If  he does  not become trained, 
good Y will  cost to + it + t (By the definition of Kh).  By entering,  he lowers the price 
of Y and recoups his training cost even if his decision to become trained triggers  further 
training of domestic  workers,  Similarly, the I  — 2'th domestic  worker will get trained if 
there are only Kd — 2 workers trained before him. This argument  extends  backwards so 
that the I  — Kd — l'th domestic worker  becomes trained. 
So far we have argued that the home region produces at least 25 which justifies the 
entry of two firms we initially  assumed. In fact the argument  can be strengthened  to show 
that the home region produces V and the autarkic equilibrium prevails.  Suppose that, on 
the contrary,  the foreign  region produces V  x which is less than K1 where x is positive. For z sufficiently large the home region will import Y. The backwards induction  argument 
implies that the domestic region will then produce M1U'1 (w + h) + U'1(w + h — t)] — 
(L* + z) = MU1(w  + h — t) 
— z which exceeds 25 because L  + z is less than K1. 
But, then, the price and wage abroad equal w + h  — t which is impossible. So z must be 
sufficiently small that the foreign region does not export the good. But, then, x must be 
zero for otherwise the foreign price and wage would again be below w  h. 